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This ~rticle addresses the question_ofthe ~resent-day applicability of the traditional positioning approach to strategy devel-
opment as bemg the most_ ~ppropnate basis for a wmnmg approach. The competcncc-hascd alternative is considered to he 
comple1~entary to the_pos1t10nmg approach. Information was collected by conducting a literature search. The validitv of the 
pos1t10nmg approach is bemg d1sp~ted because it is claimed that the challenges and opportunities pn.:scntcd hv tod,;v·s dc-
construclln¥ c~v1ronmen~al cond1t10ns make any logical and deterministic type of strategy tkvclopmcnt 1111p1;ssihlc: 1 low-
ever .. the lmdmgs of th_is research suggest that the conventional positioning approach to stratcg) dcvclopmcnt ~till 
consUtutes a basic and viable framewmk under present-~ay realities. Nevertheless. real-time ti.:chniquc, must he im.:orpo-
rated Ill order to create a more dynamic and entrepreneurial approach. Thus. it is not helicvcd that a clcar nccd cxists to re-
ject the conventi_onal approa~h and that a cautious view of a possibly new paradigm should hc adoptcd. Currcnt litcratun: 
suggests a very _lragmented field and no_ clear ~lt~rna!ive paradigm seems to emerge. Lessons gleamed from this ,tudy sug-
gest that pra~t1t10ners should guard agamst 'flltlmg from one new thing to the next·. which arc olicn not that original. and 
t_hat academics. beyond t_he1r _search for a new paradigm. should also investigate the empirical relcvam:c of the adapted 
lramework as postulated m this article. 
Introduction 
The very essence of organizational survival and profitable 
sustainability is embodied in a winning approach to strategy 
development. Such an approach is necessitated by the need to 
cope with the consequences of increasing environmental 
uncertainty, generated by the forces of value chain de-
construction. Thus, the issue addressed in this article is the 
question of the present-day applicability of the traditional 
positioning approach to strategy development as being the 
most appropriate basis for a 'winning' approach. 
Background 
Conventional strategic wisdom, known as the Prescriptive 
Schools (Mintzberg. Ahlstrand & Lampel, 1998: 353). con-
stitutes a traditional and basically rational approach to 
management. It is designed to strategically position the 
organization for competitive advantage and is built around a 
logical and system-like process, usually consisting of the fol-
lowing major components: external and internal environ-
ments, strategic intent, strategy formulation, implementation 
and control (Thompson & Strickland, 1998). 
The process commences with an analysis of the external en-
vironment ( or context) where this environment is assumed to 
be relatively stable and emphasises understanding of how ex-
ternal forces dominate strategy fornrnlation. Strategists 
should aim at achieving balance between the external and in-
ternal environments. that is the concept of beneficial fit, or 
the organization in equilibrium. The internal environment 
may be managed or manipulated in accordance with the re-
quirements of the formulated strategy - structure follows 
strategy. Strategic actions (cause/input) and reactions by com-
peting organizations display a fairly clear, linear and known 
or predictable relationship with strategic intent (desired ef-
fect/output). Strategic implementation is brought about via an 
essentially bureaucratic system (that is deliberate intervention 
by management) to ensure internal consistency. Control dis-
plays a negative feedback loop resulting in corrective refor-
mulation actions to re-establish equilibrium. The intended 
strategy is indeed considered to be realized strategy and de-
velopment of the organization over time is seen as a purpose-
ful series of logical and orderly step-by-step processes. 
However, the validity of the traditional approach is being 
disputed because it is c !aimed that the challenges and oppor-
tunities presented by today's deconstructing environmental 
conditions make any logical and deterministic type of strate-
gic planning impossible. A fundamental rethinking of basic 
principles are suggested and criticism range from. for exam-
ple, questioning the applicability of some existing paradigms 
(De Kare-Silver. 1997: chapter 4) to an outright rejection of 
the very idea of future-orientated strategy development (Gad-
dis, 1997). only short-termism is deemed possible. 
Problem statement, research objective and informa-
tion collection 
The concept of problem may best be' described as an un-
certainty or state of unrest. The research problem addressed in 
this article relates to the uncertainty of whether the traditional 
positioning approach to strategy development could (i) con-
tinue to constitute a basic and viable paradigm under new, 
present-day realities. (ii) be made more adaptable to represent 
real-time, or (iii) should be replaced by an entirely new para-
digm. 
Building upon the prohlem statement the primary resean:h 
objective is to overview and protik the relationship between 
the traditional approach to strategy development and the new 
environmental realities. Secondary research objectives are to: 
I. Review the extent to which the traditional approach 
makes provision for a turbulent external environment. and 
2. Consider criticisms levied against the traditional approach 
and the recommendations for a new paradigm. 
To accomplish the objectives information was collected by 
conducting a I iterature search. 
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Discussion of findings 
The findings of the literature survey as it relates to the major 
components of the traditional strategy development and 
positioning process, is revisited in the subsequent paragraphs. 
External environment 
Changes in the external environment have always been the 
raison d'etre for conventional strategy development (Naka-
mura, 1997: 4). The extent of turbulence, however, will vary 
and four broad levels have been identified (Courtney, Kirk-
land & Viguerie, 1997: 68-71): a clear-enough future, 
alternate futures, a range of futures and true ambiguity. The 
latter level may be described as a condition of bounded chaos 
(Levy, 1994) and is characterized by non-linear relationships, 
positive feedback loops and evolve dynamically between two 
end-points of stability and instability. According to some 
authors (e.g. Stacey, 1992 and 1996) no conventional ap-
proach to strategy is considered to be possible under these 
circumstances. On the other hand, however, it is thought to be 
possible to develop a strategic game-plan by adopting a true 
external orientation. Such an orientation can best be achieved 
by (i) endeavouring to understand the cause of turbulence, 
and (ii) acknowledging the existence of a pattern in chaos. 
It must be appreciated that the cause of turbulence is em-
bedded in actions by 'any group or individual who can affect, 
or is affected by, the organization', that is stakeholders (Free-
man, 1984). Furthermore, although a stakeholder is an entity, 
the relationships themselves are between people (Saxton & 
Grisaffe, 1997: I). People are active, not just because they 
have a commercial relationship with the organization, but 
also because they are infinitely greedy, wanting to get as 
much as possible out of the relationship and thus creating tur-
bulence. Although controversy still rages regarding the pros 
(Campbell, 1997) and cons (Argenti, 1997) of the stakeholder 
approach, it probably cannot be denied that it is a useful 
framework in explaining the rules of the environment (Camp-
bell & Alexander, 1997: 43). Consequently it leads to a better 
understanding of the dynamics of change in the external envi-
ronment and, hopefully, reduced vulnerability by the organi-
zation of being blindsided by surprises (Wilson, 1994: 20; 
Campbell & Alexander, 1997: 44). 
Secondly, to adopt an external orientation also requires ac-
knowledging the existence of a pattern or structure in chaos, 
hence the concept of' bounded instability'. The challenge for 
the strategist is to search for these patterns (or order) (McKi-
ernan, 1997: 796), giving rise to the term ofa 'chaordic' envi-
ronment - a combination of chaos and order. Indeed, 
empirical experience (Courtney, Kirkland & Viguerie, 1997: 
68 & 71) suggests that even in the most uncertain business 
environments a lot of strategically relevant information exists 
and that true ambiguity is quite rare. 
To gain an acceptable working knowledge of stakeholders 
and patterns in turbulent environments and to inject this into 
organ(zational strategy will necessitate that strategists (i) af-
ford ~~~e _for e~ternal thinking, (ii) have a supportive MIS, 
~nd (111) d1ssemmate the information throughout the organiza-
tion. Unfortunately, it would appear that all three conditions 
currently hamper, rather than enhance, an external orientation 
(Hamel & Prahalad, 1994: 64; Tapscott & Caston, 1993; Rob-
erts, 1997). These shortcomings will have to be addressed and 
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rectified before an organization can claim a true external . 
entation which will be beneficial to strategic positionino ~n-
1:o in a 
complex and turbulent external environment. 
Internal environment 
Vitally important to the success of the traditional approach is 
the requirement to achieve internal consistency with regard to 
the configuration and co-operation of organizational acti-
vities. It is clearly encapsulated in Porter's value chain 
(Porter, 1985) and relates to the need for the rational 
'Organization Man' which. unfortunately. no longer exists 
(The Organization Man, dead at 76. 1997: ~0). 
'Today businesses are populated by baby boomers and 
their Generation X offspring. who show little tolerance 
for authority' (Conger. 1998: 85). 
The value chain in its original application thus represents a 
rigid and functional-driven framework (Wilson, 1997: 18), 
outdated and inappropriate to guide a fluid internal environ-
ment, considering the volatile nature of today's external 
environment. 
Given these circumstances it has been hailed that spontane-
ous self-organization, or open-space technology (Owen, 
1991: I 0), of the organizational social system is the only way 
to deal with a new employee philosophy. Under this system 
employees have freedom to act, groups form, open political 
discussions and interaction manifest itself in conflict and ten-
sion, questioning attitudes develop. distant and lack of com-
mitment appears, group learning develops from which 
innovative and dynamic flexible new strategic directions will 
emerge, executed and controlled, in this manner coping with 
the over-changing uncertainties in the external environment. 
However, the universal viability of spontaneous self-organi-
zation may be queried as it has already been established that 
even the effectiveness of self-managed work teams has not 
been generally positive (Robbins. 1996: 350). 
Another contemporary approach is termed the value con-
stellation activity system (VCAS) (Porter. 1996; Nakamura, 
1997: 8). It is a system which requires trade-offs, choice and 
combinations, yet maintains internal consistency and is plan-
ned and executed around core competency process deploy-
ment (Steele, 1995). This approach results in increasing line 
involvement in strategy and the dissemination of information 
throughout the entire organization. The most obvious benefit 
of the dynamic VCAS lies in its controlled, consistent and in-
tegrated internal flexibility, affording it the ability to adjust to 
a wide array of changing and overlapping industry boundaries 
- a necessity for functioning in a turbulent external environ· 
ment (Porter, 1996: 63 ). 
Strategic intent 
For the purpose of this article the concept of strategic intent is 
reflected in a balanced hierarchy of vision, mission, goals and 
objectives. Vision and mission is regarded as broad strategic 
guidelines for positioning the organization. now and for the 
long-tenn future. whilst goals and objectives represent the 
shorter tenn and thus operational expressions thereof. How· 
ever, given the uncertainties in both the external and internal 
environments, it is contended that it is not feasible to set a 
vision (externally directed) and mission (internally directed) 
and that the organization can at best rely on measuring 
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progress only against relatively short-tenn operational goals 
and objectives. 
On the other hand, a turbulent external environment proba-
bly requires the organization to have a guideline or vision 
even more so than in a relatively stable environment. It will, 
however, have to build upon the structured concept of a tangi-
ble (future) image and also introduce a more vague or broad 
component (Collins & Porras, 1991 }, that is in keeping with 
the uncertainties of the external environment. A case in point 
is lnfocom (Chakravarthy, 1997: 80), an organization operat-
ing in the highly turbulent and complex information commu-
nications industry, which simply defines its vision as 'a 
computer screen that will be a window into a virtual world'. 
The mission provides a link with the futuristic vision and is a 
current exposition of particularly the internal nature of the 
business - who?, what? and how? as it relates to the customer 
environment. The uncertainties in this environment do not ne-
gate the need for a mission, it only demands a wider and more 
flexible definition (Wilson, 1994: 19). Firstly, the scope of 
who? and what? must be extended from a narrow focus on 
existing customers and their needs to reflect a broader exter-
nal orientation. Thus, although it is fashionable to be cus-
tomer-led, it is essentially a short-sighted approach in a 
turbulent environment in that vast unexploited and unserveq 
opportunities (who?, what?) are continuously ignored (Sud-
harhsan, 1995: 242-243). Secondly, to construct a single mis-
sion statement for a scattered portfolio of existing and future 
market offers, but especially the appropriate technologies and 
activities (how?) to accomplish them, can at best be described 
as difficult. A solution might be to provide strategic focus for 
the internal stakeholders through a cascading hierarchy al-
lowing for an overall and broad 'heterogeneous' mission and 
individualised sub-missions for the more homogeneous and 
identifiable activities and units of the organization, perhaps 
related to core competencies and project teams. This ap-
proach would be similar in concept to that suggested for con-




The appropriate business strategy to achieve a desired ex-
ternal positioning is considered to be shaped by (i) general 
environmental conditions, (ii) the competitive environment 
and (iii) the style of business. The question arises whether 
existing conventional models in this regard do provide for 
conditions of turbulence in the general as well as competitive 
environments? 
a. General environmental conditions 
The popular SWOT-audit represents the original structured 
attempt to align and design a fit between an organization's 
internal capability and its external situation, thus suggesting 
the positional direction of strategic thrust. In its simplistic 
application it does not differentiate between stable and 
turbulent conditions (Zajak, Kraatz & Bresser, 1997). 
Attempts have, however, been made to adjust it to being a 
more flexible instrument and to change strategic direction 
along with environmental changes (Pickton & Wright, 1998). 
Other noted models include: 
II 
- Miles & Snow ( 1978) differentiate between four strategic 
styles: 
Prospector. Defender, Analyser. Reactor - each one re-
lated to particular environmental conditions. The Prospec-
tor strategy is specifically aimed at aligning with turbulent 
conditions in the external environment. 
- Mintzberg & Waters ( 1985) contend that a tendency for 
the concept of an emergent strategy exists in relatively un-
stable conditions and identifies two strategic styles which 
are particularly relevant in a complex. unpredictable and 
uncontrollable environment. namely Umbrella and Proc-
ess. 
- Gould & Campbell ( 1987) identify three strategic styles of 
which the Strategic Planning Style is considered to be the 
most appropriate under conditions where changes in cus-
tomer requirements and competitive groupings are turbu-
lent and competition intense. 
- Rowe, Mason. Dichel & Snyder ( 1989) developed a Stra-
tegic Position and Action Evaluation (Space) model 
which indicates either a Competitive or Defensive strate-
gic thrust under unstable conditions. 
- Ansoff ( 1990) considers the Entrepreneurial and Creative 
strategic postures as appropriate for a surprising environ-
ment. 
- Covin ( 1991) identifies an Entrepreneurial Strategy suita-
ble for turbulent conditions. 
- Courtney, Kirkland & Viguerie ( 1997) regard the Shaper 
strategy most appropriate for a complex and unpredictable 
environment. 
The above examples serve to illustrate that existing conven-
tional frameworks do appear to make provision for formulat-
ing strategies under conditions of relatively high turbulence 
in the general external environment. 
b. Competitive environment 
The competitive environment represents a relatively homo-
geneous entity within the general external environment and 
exerts its own particular influences on the formulation of 
business strategy via (i) competitive positioning and ( ii) 
competitive style of business. 
- Competitive positioning 
Competitive positioning to establish a sustainable compet-
itive advantage was pioneered by Porter ( 1985) as being 
the generic strategies of cost leads:rship and differentia-
tion. In this regard more recent research indicates that 
winning companies tend to follow common themes to sur-
vive and prosper in hostile environments (Potter. 1994 ). In 
their application these themes seem to relate to the broad 
categories of cost leadership and differentiation. It has 
also been confirmed that successful organizations 'who 
live on the edge of a changing world' tend to follow dear 
patterns of behaviour which relate to either cost leadership 
or differentiation (Tracey & Wiersema. 1995 ). The fore-
going findings suggesting that Porter's strategies may still 
be applicable in the present-day conditions of environ-
mental turbulence. 
Hax & Wilde ( 1997) are of the opinion that three compet-
itive strategic positions are most relevant to a complex. 
unpredictable environment which is characterised by con-
tinuous and inexorable change: Best Product. Total Cus-
tomer Solution and System Lock-in. 
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Again. the above references to models to_ formulate _a 
strategy for positioning the business to attain a co'.11pett-
tive advantage, suggest that they do appear to provide for 
turbulent environmental conditions. 
- Style of business 
Competitive style (offensive/defensive) of busi~~ss or 
warfare strategy. is often seen to be very formal, ng1d and 
structured. ostensibly rendering it totally inappropriate for 
rapidly changing circumstances. This perception should 
be reconsidered. Whilst it is true that warfare adheres to 
strict principles, it is also regarded that it is virtually im-
possible in uncertain battle conditions to plan the whole 
campaign in detail and certainly futile to try to do so, that 
is 'maintain your objectives and adjust your plans' (Wee, 
1994: 191 ). In fact, under uncertainty the military is gen-
erally of the belief that systematic strategic planning is 
even more applicable when belligerence and huge uncer-
tainties face them (Crouch, 1998). 
Corporate strategy 
Formulating a corporate strategy concerns two broad aspects 
namely, (i) entering new business (diversification) and (ii) 
managing a portfolio of businesses. 
The acquisition (take-overs and mergers) of an existing 
business is the most popular form of diversification but, ac-
cording to various surveys (Porter, 1987; Van de Vliet, 1997; 
Lynch, 1997: 559), seem to achieve limited success in in-
creasing shareholder value. This may be because diversifica-
tion criteria often tends to be mainly financially orientated 
and assume the notion of a relatively stable and predictable 
future, which is the very essence of the criticism against the 
conventional approach to strategy formulation. Given the 
need for adaptability in a turbulent environment, organiza-
tions are increasingly seeking relationships, other than long-
term 'formal' acquisitions, which will allow them more space 
to be maneuverable. The relatively shorter term and more 
flexible configurations of strategic alliances, outsourcing, 
competition and the virtual corporation is a modem-day ex-
pression of the basic concept of diversification. It is, however, 
constructed according to a 'new form organization' architec-
ture which is able to cope with complexities in the environ-
ment, the very concept of diversification is in transition 
(Ferreira, 1997). 
Managing a diversified portfolio concerns decisions to im-
prove the quality of a collection of businesses in order to 
achieve overall shareholder advantage. In this regard the 
well-known Boston Consulting Group (BCG) and General 
Electric (GE) portfolio i}nalyses are considered to be of prime 
importance. In their original format these models depict the 
current and future positionings of organizational units, where 
the future position is being determined by intended strategy. 
Called 'point positioning' it represents only a useful approach 
when the environmental turbulence level is low and stable - it 
becomes misleading, dangerous and uncertain in highly tur-
bulent environments. In an effort to overcome the shortcom-
ings of point positioning, portfolio models can adopt the more 
dynamic concept of 'dispersed positioning'. Here the analy-
ses and outcomes are not confined to one future moment in 
time but establishes a historical, present and alternative ex-
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pected future positionings ·- the latter is not only a single 
point judgement. but rather a range of options based on sce-
narios and interchangeable strategies ( Ansoff & McDonnel. 
1990: 99). 
Conclusion - strategyformulation 
The foregoing discussion suggests that contemporary ap-
proaches to both business and corporate strategy formulation 
do appear to attempt to allow for conditions of high un-
certainty in the environment. Furthermore, a computer 
simulation called ANSPLAN-A has already been designed 
especially for strategy formulation in turbulent environments 
(Ansoff & McDonnell. 1990: I 09). However, all of these 
models or frameworks are still curtailed by the rigidity of the 
analytical application of formal and prescriptive planning 
processes. In an endeavour to overcome this, organizations 
will also have to adopt and adapt their conventional strategy 
formulation tool kit with real-time techniques. 
Injecting real-time techniques 
In an effort to get closer to real-time strategy some specific 
techniques may be injected into the conventional strategy 
formulation process to create a more dynamic and emerging 
approach (Mulligan. Hatten & Miller. 1996). Dialectic 
Inquire (DI) was driven and developed by the observation 
that the pace of environmental change forced managers to 
make decisions before all desired data could be collected 
Strategic Assumption Analysis (SAA) is an extension of DI 
in that it reviews strategy in terms of future assumptions 
based on scenarios of the turbulent environment. Issue-based 
Planning (IBP) is regarded as a key responsibility of strategic 
planning for today and looks for strategic action. based on 
sporadic and developing issues. The Strategic Assumption 
Surfacing and Testing Procedures (SAST) technique re· 
presents an early but yet very effective effort to combine 
assumptions, issues and stakeholders (Mason & Mitroff, 
1981). As a next step. the Japanese strategic planning 
approach known in the Western World as Hoshin Kanri may 
be adopted. It views strategy development at the short-term 
tactical level, thus emphasising the need for the entire 
organization to be sensitive and strategically responsive to a 
turbulent external environment. 
The application and use of real-time techniques generally 
tend to expect experience. intuition and judgement from the 
strategist, that is common sense and street wisdom. This 
introduces the pro-active entrepreneurial element into the for· 
mal development of the strategy. Unfortunately. entrepreneur· 
ial input is often perceived to be a risk-taking startup 
approach rather than something that any strategist has to per· 
form. The above consideration is akin to Ansoffs 1967 view 
of a 'formal process of entrepreneurial planning' (Hussey. 
1999a: 379). 
Strategy implementation 
Conventional strategy implementation encompasses the tr~di· 
tional tasks of organization building. budget allocatwn. 
developing strategy-supportive systems. shaping culture and 
instituting performance-related rewards. These tasks are to_ be 
achieved by exercising strategic leadership. Notwithstanding 
this impressive list of activities. implementation remains to be 
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a problem (Waldersee & Sheather, 1996: 105) and hence a 
phletora of refinements have been introduced over time in an 
endeavour to enhance the implementation process. Un-
fortunately, relatively little attention seems to have been 
afforded specifically to implementation during times of 
turbulence (bar transformation interventions) (Hinterhuber & 
Krauthammer, 1998), the exception being the process of 
spontaneous self-organization. Here implementation trans-
forms from bureaucratic leadership to adhocracy but the 
success of this approach appears to be mainly confined to 
organizations in highly innovative and complex niche 
industries, for example aerospace and film making. Two sup-
plementary and contemporary approaches to implementation 
which is considered to have a broad application as well as 
deal with turbulence in the external and internal environ-
ments, have been suggested by D'Aveni (1994), the New 7-
S's model, and Kaplan & Norton ( 1996), the Balanced 
Scorecard (BSC). 
The D'Aveni model introduces implementation flexibility 
by: 
I. Not treating implementation as being separate from strat-
egy formulation and the underlying analyses, and 
2. Integrating important external considerations with internal 
structures and pro-active actions. 
The model purports to introduce a comprehensive and 
structured approach to implementation which incorporates 
and combines many components of contemporary strategic 
thinking, that is, stakeholders, looking beyond market orien-
tation, flexibility and pro-active actions appropriate for a tur-
bulent environment. 
Kaplan & Norton's development of the BSC represents a 
specific and integrated management system which translates 
vision and strategy into four perspectives namely, customer, 
internal processes, learning and financial. It appears to be par-
ticularly applicable where organizations face relatively turbu-
lent and competitive environments. The model enables an 
organization to facilitate the translation of strategy into imple-
mentation actions, whilst simultaneously allowing the strat-
egy to evolve in response to the changing environment. 
Both the New 7-S's and the BSC models are relatively new 
but have been widely adopted, particularly the BSC. Both ap-
pear to serve implementation unifonnly, over a broad spec-
trum of industries and, although constituting a general 
template, also provides the ability to design unique frame-
works that specifically fits the needs of a particular organiza-
tion. It is considered that the perceived advantages in the 
application of these two models may ensure their sustainable 
presence for some time to come. 
Strategic control 
The traditional approach to control embraces setting stan-
dards, developing a measurement system, comparing results 
with standards and then taking corrective action (re fonn-
ulation) where and when required. However, it is considered 
that: 
IJ 
- Historically, emphasis has been placed on strategy formu-
lation, rather than control, thus concentrating on develop-
ing sophisticated planning tools and processes and giving 
relatively scant attention to higher order. strategic controls 
(Grundy, 1998: 44). This in turn resulted in stressing the 
importance of operational. easily quantifiable criteria. for 
example financial and market measurements (Eccles. 
1991). 
- The above situation has been exacerbated by the ever in-
creasing turbulence and complexity in the organizational 
environments, leading to the contention that it is not pos-
sible to set and control future-orientated strategic aims. 
only ex post operational objectives can be controlled or 
continuously merging situations be shaped. 
Paradoxically, it would seem that it is the very turbulence 
and uncertainty in the environment, and the accompanying 
risks, which is necessitating the organization to shift its em-
phasis to also include strategic controls. Various attempts 
have been made in this regard. 
In its original ( 1992) construct the BSC concentrated on 
broadening the traditional financial performance measures by 
including overall measures of those components that drive or-
ganizations forward. that is strategic control measures. To ef-
fect this goals were set and clear measures identified to access 
organizational performance in the strategic areas of the cus-
tomer, internal business processes and innovation and learn-
ing. In a turbulent environment the BSC keeps organizations 
looking and moving forward, instead of backward (Duvel & 
Rumbel, 1998: 38). 
Supplementary to the BSC the concept of strategic manage-
ment accounting (SMA) has developed (Dixon, 1998 272-
279). Pioneered by KPMG's Business Measurement Process 
(BMP) assessment of organizational risk not only measures 
the financial perspective but, through a much broader lens. 
also aspects which include the organization and the industry 
(external environment) (Bell. Morris, Soloman & Thomas. 
1997). As such it is considered a way of interconnecting the 
internal business processes to a diverse and rapidly changing 
environment. In both its com,truct and application the BMP 
does not appear to differ extensively from the BSC. 
According to Grundy ( 1998) the BSC. and thus by implica-
tion the BMP, suffers from two major shortcomings namely. 
not being enough future orientated in a turbulent environ-
ment, and presenting too narrow a view by competitively con-
centrating on customers rather than stakeholders. To negate 
these shortcomings he proposes a model to combine strategic 
health (present competitive position and future strategic po-
tential) and financial performance (roe and cash flow). At this 
stage, unfortunately. too little is known about the empirical 
validity of the proposed model to draw any clear inferences 
about its possible broad application. 
Summary 
The findings of this literature overview relating to the pro-
filing of the relationship between the conventional position-
ing approach to strategy and the current environmental 
realities, can briefly be summarised as follows: 
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- Turbulence in the external environment is central to strat-
egy but true ambiguity is considered quite rare. For this 
reason, it is thought to be possible to develop, in a conven-
tional way, a strategic game plan by adopting a deep ex-
ternal orientation. This will, however, necessitate 
affording time for external thinking, having a supportive 
MIS and disseminating infonnation throughout the organ-
ization. 
- Critical to the success of the conventional approach is the 
requirement to achieve internal consistency. In this regard 
the original. somewhat rigid and functional-driven appli-
cation of the value chain has evolved to the development 
of the value constellation activity system. This system's 
major benefit being its integrated but yet consistent inter-
nal flexibility, a necessity in a turbulent external environ-
ment. 
- The need for a guiding vision and mission remains imper-
ative under turbulent environmental conditions. However, 
in keeping with the uncertainties the vision should also in-
troduce a broader, less tangible (even more vague) com-
ponent. whilst the mission too demands a wider and more 
flexible definition. 
- Contemporary conventional models for the fonnulation of 
both business and corporate strategies do appear to pro-
vide for belligerence and major uncertainties. They, how-
ever, still tend to follow fonnal processes. 
- In an endeavour to overcome the rigidity of fonnal proc-
esses, various real-time techniques may be infused into 
conventional strategy fonnulation models. 
- Contemporary frameworks for strategy implementation 
specifically aim at creating flexible internal action struc-
tures in an effort to provide an interconnectedness with a 
turbulent environment. 
- Turbulence in the environment, and the accompanying 
risks, necessitates a shift from a conventional emphasis on 
operational controls, to also include future-orientated stra-
tegic controls. Various models have been proposed in this 
regard. 
Conclusion 
From the findings of this research it may be concluded that: 
- The conventional positioning approach to strategy devel-
opment still constitutes a basic and viable framework 
within which to think under present-day realities. It serves 
as a guide and is not definitive in nature. 
- Contemporary real-time refinements which are available 
should be incorporated into the base model to make it 
more adaptable and entrepreneurial. Thus developing a 
more emerging type of strategy applicable to the con-
straints posed by complex new environmental realities. 
- It is thus not believed that a clear need exists to outright 
reject the conventional approach and that a cautious view 
of a possibly new paradigm should be adopted. 
- Consideration of current literature suggests a very frag-
mented field (Hussey, 1999: 243-247), no clear alterna-
tive paradigm seems to emerge. 
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Discussion 
The research for this article focused on the applicability, or 
otherwise, of the conventional positioning strategy develop-
ment approach. In past years there has, however, been a 
switch of attention from finding the most advantageous 
position for the organization in relation to its environment, to 
that of a competence-based alternative (Sanchez, Heene & 
Thomas, 1996). 
This approach assumes that the key factors for success lie 
within the organization itself in terms of its portfolio of re-
sources, capabilities and competences. These are typically 
classified into two types. namely tangible and intangible. Al-
though both types are required. competence-based theorists 
argue that intangible resources are the most likely source of 
value creation and therefore competitive advantage in decon-
structing environments (Alessandri. llinitch & McDaniel, 
1999). Nevertheless. they are indeed of the opinion that. in 
any case, the external environment only explains I 0% (Ru-
melt, 1991) to 20% (NAA, 1998:35) of the profit rates across 
organizations. 
In essence there seems to be little radically new in the com-
petence-based approach. It appears to be an emphasis of one 
part of the overall strategy development framework first pos-
tulated by Ansoff ( 1965: 90) over 30 years ago when he de-
scribed a competence profile or 'grid of competences'. As 
such the positioning and competence approaches do not nec-
essarily constitute an either-or situation but indeed probably 
complement each other. 
Recommendations 
The 'lessons' to be gleamed from this literature study rather 
than to preposterously claim conclusive recommendations, 
are ofa two tier nature namely, for practitioners and academic 
researchers. 
Practitioners should guard against 'flitting from one new 
thing to the next'. Applying a phletora of the latest manage-
ment fads does not necessarily improve performance (Bekker. 
1999). Also, it is true to say that many of the 'new' ideas are 
not as novel. Many of the new thoughts of today are remarka-
bly similar to many of the new ideas of the 1950s and 1960s 
(Hussey, 1998: 4 ). A case in point being the French Tuh/eau 
de Bord which is similar in concept to the BSC and have been 
in use for more than 50 years (Epstein & Manzoni. t 997: 28). 
The conventional positioning posture. as adapted, is believed 
to provide a sturdy, reliable and proven vehicle for a system-
atic way in which an organization may think (not be dictated 
to) about strategy development in a formal way. A few basic 
questions regarding strategy development will usually suffice 
(Harvard Management Update. 2000). 
Academic researchers should pursue their investigations. 
However, rather than follow a piece-meal approach or en· 
deavour to merge different schools to create a new paradigm 
(Mintzberg, Ahlstrand & Lampel. 1998: 302). it is suggested 
that comprehensive empirical research is needed to confirm 
(or reject) the validity. under present environmental condi-
tions, of the adapted conventional framework as postulated in 
this article. Exploratory resean.:h in this regard seems to find 
tentative confirmation of this view (Dettling. 1999). This. ob-
viously, does not negate a continuous search towards an 
agreed, and truly new paradigm. 
S.Afr.JBus.Manage.2000.31 (I) 
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